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Financial Year
The nation's financial institutions expe-
rienced anothertumultuous year in 1981,
under the impactoffinancial innovation,
recession and still-severe inflation. Butat
least some progress was evident on the latter
front, reflecting the Federal Reserve's two-
year-old shiftto a tighter policy stance.
The narrow measure ofthe money supply-
currency plus transaction (checking-type)
accounts-decelerated sharply in 1981
following modestdeclines in each ofthe
preceding two years. (This monetary aggre-
gate, known as M1-B in 1981, henceforth will
beknown simplyas M 1.) Bythis measure, the
money supply increased about five percent
during 1981, roughly in the middleofthe
Federal Reserve's target growth range of3V,
to 6 percent. (For an analysis ofmoney-
growth measures, see the Weekly Letter of
January 1, 1982.)The broader M2 money-
supply measure-primarilycurrency plus all
depository institutions' deposits (except large
time certificates) and money-market shares
-increased almost 10 percent for the year.
The Federal Reserve's increased success in
slowingmoney-supply growth reflected its
greater experience with new operating pro-
cedures adopted in October 1979. Althat
time, the Fed announced that it would no
longerpeg the cost ofbank reserves (the
Federal-funds rate) and would instead target
the level ofreserves in the banking system.
Consistent with this policy, the Fed took
action on several occasions during 1981 to
steer money growth towards the targets
- announced in February. Duringthe spring
months, as moneygrowth began to surge, the
Fed sharply restricted the supply ofavailable
reserves and meanwhileraised both the
discount rate (to 14 percent) and the sur-
chargeon frequent borrowings by large
banks (to four percent). Faced with the
opposite problem ofslow growth in the late
----------
summer and fall months, the Fed increased
the supplyofreserves-and in addition,
lowered the discount rate in two steps (to 12
percent), and reduced and finally eliminated
the surcharge on frequent borrowings.
Shifting Credit Markets
With borrowing demands relatively heavy in
the face ofa tightening monetary policy,
interest rates remained in the stratosphere
throughout most ofthe year; however, rates
did move downward in the late-1981 reces-
sion environment. The yield curve traced by
instrumentsofgradually increasing maturity
remained inverted for much ofthe year, with
short-term rates remaining above long-term
rates. The primehusiness-Ioan rate started the
year at 21 V, percent, and after retreating,
climbed again to a 20V,-percent secondary
peak in the late summer months, before
dropping to 16 percent in December. In
contrast, corporate AAA bond rates declined
during the fall months, but at December's
14-percentaverage level, were somewhat
higherthan at the beginning ofthe year. Real
(inflation-adjusted) interest rates soared to
record heights inthis atmosphere, becauseof
investors' fears ofresurgent inflation and
Federal government "crowding-out"ofother
borrowers.
To finance its massive revenue shortfall, the
Treasury stepped up the pace ofits fund-
raising efforts. Federally-sponsored agencies
likewise increased their borrowing activities
compared with 1980. The Federal Home
Loan Bank System, in particular, actively
sought funds tosupport its lendingprogram to
asavings-and-Ioan industrythatwas battered
by poor earnings and outflows offunds
throughout the year. Total federally-related
financing demands thus jumped from $83 to
an estimated $97 billion during 1981. State
and local governments, by contrast, became
moderately less active in credit markets.
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rates frequently exceeded statutory interest-
rate ceilings on their borrowings. Also, local
governments sharply curtailed their sales
ofmortgage-revenue bonds because of
new legal restrictions on the sale ofsuch'
instruments.
Corporate businesses resorted to the credit
markets more frequently in 1981 than in
1980, concentrating most oftheir increased
borrowing in the shorter end ofthe market
despite the persistently inverted shapeofthe
yield curve. Firms relied heavily on
commercial-bank loans and commercial-
paper issues for the short-term working
capital that, becauseofpoorearnings growth,
could not be generated internally at an
adequate pace. Businesses generally post-
poned long-term bOnd offerings and stock
sales during the year, hopingthat overall
credit demands would ease and bringdown
the level ofinterest rates. The new-issues
pace rose significantly, however, during the
several periods ofdeclining rates in the late
spring and late fall months.
Households stepped up their overall borrow-
ing pace, at least in contrast to 1980, when
the spring period's credit-control program
caused a sharp reduction in consumer-credit
balances. Indeed, short-term consumer debt
grew an estimated 10 times faster in 1981
than in 1980. In contrast, home-mortgage
debt grew at a somewhat slower pace, as
households reduced their purchases ofnew
homes in response to mortgage rates which
exceeded 17 percent at the summer peak.
Gain in Bank Credit
Cdmmercial-bank credit increased by eight
percent-aboutthesame as in 1980's slug-
gish atmosphere-although loan portfolios
increased at a somewhat more rapid pace
than securities-investment portfolios. Busi-
ness loans, in particular, grew at a fairly
healthy(11 percent)paceduringthe year. But
in view ofthe intense competition from the
commercial-paper market and from foreign
banks, banks apparently paid dearly in many
cases for the business-loan expansion-
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either by cutting profit margins orbytaking
on somewhat riskier loans. Banks also in-
creased their real-estate loans almosteight
percent over the year, somewhat paradoxi-
cally in view ofthe sharp decline in home-
building activity. But much ofthe real-estate
lending was concentrated either in commer-
cial real estate loans orin home-equity loans,
which households found to be a more
attractive financing source for durable-goods
purchases than installment credit. Much of
the real-estate lending activitythus could be
classified as consumer credit, which would
explain the very small one-percent increase
in consumer borrowing activity during the
year.
Banks faced intense competition for funds to
finance 1981's creditexpansion, in viewof
the attractiveness to depositors ofmoney-
market mutual funds and thrift-institution
NOWaccounts. And banks found deposit
growth very costly, since mostofthe growth
occurred in deposit categories that paid
market-related rates ofinterest-money-
market certificates, small-saver certificates,
and large-denomination (over $100,000)
certificates ofdeposit. Overthe year, higher-
yieldingdeposit categories rose from 45
percentto morethan 55 percentofsmall time
and savings deposits, reflecting shiftsoffunds
into these categories from cOre deposits
(passbook savings and checking accounts).
Furthermore, even transaction deposits
became more expensive for banks as depos-
itors shifted their funds from the traditional
zero-interest checking accounts to NOW
accounts paying 5Y4-percent interest.
lacklusterBank Earnings
The banking industry generally turned in a
lackluster profits performance forthe year,
accordingto preliminary indications, with
earnings just about matchingthe preceding
year's level. The continued shift ofcore
deposits to higher-cost categories substan-
tially raised banks' average costs offunds. At
the same time, stiffprice competition on the
lending side made it difficult for banks to
recoup these cost increases, and thereby------------ ---------------
caused aweakening ofnet interest margins
and profits. Earnings performance varied
considerably, however, depending on the
sensitivity ofeach bank's portfolio to
increases in the cost offunds and changes in
interest rates. Wholesale (commercially-
oriented) banks generally avoided deteriora-
tion ofinterest margins by keeping the
maturities ofboth assets and liabilities short.
In contrast, many retail (consumer-oriented)
banks suffered because ofamismatching of
maturities, with the rise in their cost offunds
generally outpacing increases in their return
on assets. With aheavy concentration of
longer-term fixed-rate mortgage and Con-
sumer loans, retail banks failed to receive
higher returns even as interest rates remained
high throughout mostofthe year. Theirprofits
became further squeezed as their core de-
posits shifted to expensive money-market
and small-saver certificates, thus boosting
costs in line with market interest rates.
In general, high interest rates remained a
problem for the banking industry as well as
for its customers during 1981 . Banks tried to
cope withthis environmentbycurtailingtheir
long-term fixed-rate lending and by limiting
their exposure to changes in interest rates.
They made substantial progress in this regard,
although the continuing shiftofdepositfunds
to high-cost categories took its toll overthe
year. Nevertheless, the late-fall easing of
interest rates brightened year-end earnings
prospects for many banks and other deposi-
tory institutions.
Uncertain '82
The outlook for banks and other financial
institutions is uncertain in the recession
atmosphere ofearly 1982. Nonetheless,
credit demands should remain strong,
especially in view of the Federal govern-
ment's stepped-up efforts to finance a
swelling budget deficit. A sustained easing of
interest rates may not be in the cards, there-
fore-atleast until defiCit-financingpressures
weaken and inflation expectations become
less intense.
Commercial banks should be in aposition to
participate in the anticipated credit expan-
sion. On the lending side, however, banks are
likelyto face stiff competition from the bond
and commercial-paper markets and from
foreign banks as well. The business-lending
pace, in particular, should strengthen as
corporations seek to replenish depleted
working capital. Household borrowing also
should improve as consumer psychology
brightens in the midyear tax-cut atmosphere,
and mortgage borrowing should begin to rise
out ofthe depths as real-estate lending rates
subside. The cost of financing this loan
expansion will remain high, however, as
low-cost core deposits continue to shift to
higher-cost money-market and small-saver
certificates_ Banks will also face stiff compe-
tition for customers' funds from money-
market funds and other (less regu lated)
nondepository institutions. In this atmo-
sphere, the most successful banks will be
those that closely manage their exposure to
interest-rate changes and keep close control
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loans(gross, adjusted) and investments* 156,048 - 180 7,959 5.4
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 134,915 - 191 9,547 7.6
Commercial and industrial 41,354 81 3,591 9.5
Real estate 55,734 85 5,233 10.4
loansto individuals 23,791 161 - 151 - 0.6
Securities loans 2,027 - 231 593 41.4
U.s. Treasury securities* 5,830 - 44 - 1,103 - 15.9
Othersecurities* 15,303 55 - 481 - 3.0
Demand deposits - total# 43,785 1,328 - 5,515 - 11.2
Demand deposits - adjusted 29,507 700 - 3,918 - 11.7
Savings deposits - total 30,098 152 1,823 6.4
Time deposits - total# 89,782 276 15,003 20.1
Individuals, part. & corp. 80,678 199 15,756 24.3
(Large negotiable CD's) 36,411 317 6,466 21.6
Weeldy Averages
ofDaily Figures
Member Bank Reserve Position
Excess Reserves (+l/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings {
















* Excludes tradmg account securities.
# Includes items not shown separately.
Editorial comments may be addressed totheeditor (William Burke) ortothe author•..•Freecopies ofthis
andotherfederal ReservepublicationScanbeobtained bycallingorwritingthePublic Infonnationsection,
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